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Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to provide non-marketed environmental 
services need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to 
achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and putting the 
contracts up for tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by 
combining the benefits of both approaches. Landholder risk aversion may offset incentive 
effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Using 
controlled lab experiments in two countries and across four subject groups, and 
systematically varying the rate at which payments are linked to uncertain outcomes, this 
paper clarifies the conditions under which incentives overcome risk-aversion – a 
parameter which was also measured. Results show that for risk averse landholders the 
most efficient approach is in general to tender contracts only moderately linked to 
environmental outcomes – that is, using a balanced combination of fixed input payments 
and of payments linked to uncertain outcomes. This paper also highlights how 
experiments can complement the inherent limitations of a purely theoretical analysis.   
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1.   Introduction 
 
1.1   Motivation 
In the last three decades, governments around the globe have developed market-
based policy instruments to procure environmental services from private landholders. 
Conservation contracting represents the most commonly used policy instrument in this 
respect. The increased importance of environmental contracting has, to date, not been 
reflected in innovative policy design. It remains the norm in most conservation programs 
to offer a uniform payment for compliance with a uniform set of management 
prescriptions. This approach has been criticized on two accounts: First, prescription or 
action-based payments fail to provide incentives for producers to seek out new methods 
of reducing costs, to introduce innovative approaches, or to take risks in seeking to 
provide environmental benefits [4]. In fact, action-based payments may tempt their 
recipients not to honor their contracts to the letter, giving rise to a moral hazard problem. 
Second, uniform payments may cause another incentive problem, that of adverse 
selection, by failing to cater for the heterogeneity of compliance costs and resource 
settings among landholders. Any uniform payment for voluntary participation will thus 
attract low-cost farmers who are over-rewarded whilst failing to attract higher-cost 
farmers who might deliver additional benefits.   
This paper sets out to explore two proposals that have been made to that effect: 
linking contract payments to environmental outcomes (rather than management 
prescriptions) and putting the contracts up for tender (rather than paying landholders 
uniform prices). Whereas the two aspects have mostly been studied in isolation in the 
literature, the focus of the present paper is on exploring the combined effect of outcome-
based payments and tendering on conservation behavior and the resultant performance of 
conservation contracting. In the interest of clarity, we will however explore the two 
aspects consecutively. We will first investigate the impact of linking payments to 
environmental outcomes in a non-tendered setting. Subsequently, we will study the 
additional impact on conservation behavior of putting such incentive contracts up for 
tender.  
Theoretical predictions are far from clear. Outcome-based payments do harness 
the self-interest of their recipients to act in the interest of the conservation agency by 
optimizing their stewardship effort. At the same time, such payments create previously 
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absent risks for landholders, some or many of which are beyond their control. It can 
happen that, due to factors such as disease, pest invasions, fire, drought, or natural 
fluctuations in wildlife populations, the environmental outcome is much diminished or 
even nil – in spite of the fact that costly on-ground actions have been carried out. This is 
likely to reduce participation in the scheme and thereby its environmental effectiveness. 
There is thus a tradeoff to be studied between an incentive effect on the one hand and a 
participation effect on the other. If the latter outweighs the former, linking payments to 
uncertain outcomes will be counterproductive. 
The motivation for studying the impact of tendering lies with two key properties 
of auctions. First, properly designed, auctions create scarcity amongst landholders in that 
the number of contracts on offer is set to be (much) less than the potential demand for 
them. As a result, tendering creates competition among potential bidders, thereby 
reducing the incentive to overbid above real costs. Second, and as a consequence of the 
previous point, auction bids reveal information on bidders’ costs, thereby mitigating 
information asymmetry and adverse selection. Putting incentive contracts up for tender 
thus has the potential to kill two birds with one stone: the moral hazard problem and the 
adverse selection problem. At the same time, this approach involves the danger of 
exposing landholders to excessive risks so that they refuse to participate in conservation 
schemes in the first place.  
1.2  Previous work  
This study builds on three strands of previous work: the problem of efficiently 
allocating conservation contracts; the theory of auctioning incentive contracts; and the 
design and implementation of conservation auctions. These represent a logical 
progression from how to get landholders to provide conservation services efficiently, to 
the idea of tendering incentive contracts and finally to investigating how far this idea can 
be made to work for conservation policy. The problem of optimally selecting 
conservation actions and sites includes investigations by Van Teefelen and Moilanen [34] 
and by Costello and Polasky [3]. Casting the solution of this problem into an appropriate 
analytical economic framework includes work by Moxey et al. [26] and Davis et al. [5]. 
This framework highlighted the key issue, that of moral hazard in a principal-agent 
relationship [8,15]. Accordingly, the problem of how to design contracts in such a way as 
to address this problem was studied by authors like Moxey et al. [27], Ozanne and White 
[28] and Ferraro [7]; White[35] also analyzed the correlative issue of contract monitoring.  
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Getting the contracted parties to provide the necessary effort to deliver the 
contracted goods to quality specifications was a problem first clearly formulated by 
Green [13] in 1979. This problem was cast into the analytical framework of the principal-
agent relationship by McAfee and McMillan [25], Laffont and Martimort [22] and 
Laffont and Tirole [19]. Leitzel and Tirole [21] applied this framework to the 
procurement setting. This idea had also been pursued by Laffont and Tirole [18] by 
combining and integrating the linking of contractual payments to outcomes and the 
auctioning of the contracts in a competitive setting; Branco [1] generalized some of the 
results obtained by Laffont and Tirole in 1987. The static setting was also expanded to the 
dynamic setting by Laffont and Tirole (1988), with a follow-up by Sun Ching-jen [33] in 
2007. This work provided the theoretical bedrock on which applications to environmental 
policy could be formulated.  
The key problem in the present study was how to optimally select contracts for 
conservation works that are to be carried out by landholders [16]. Latacz-Lohmann and 
Schilizzi [24] review the literature on how ideas from auction design and implementation 
have been applied to conservation contracting, and Latacz-Lohmann and Van der 
Hamsvoort [23] propose a specific model for doing so when budgets are constrained 
(which is normally the case). A number of policy implementations were reviewed, mainly 
in the USA and Australia [29,31]. Evaluation of this experience by Grafton [12], Gole et 
al. [10] and Connor et al. [2] highlighted the problematic nature of paying landholders 
uniquely on actions or inputs, e.g. fencing, weeding or planting trees, without specific 
reference to the actual environmental outcomes, such as streamwater quality, a measure 
of biodiversity or the rate of soil erosion. At this juncture, the idea of tendering contracts 
to landholders and that of linking contract payments to environmental outcomes were 
brought together, linking the two previous strands of literature. This integration has now 
begun to be investigated both theoretically [11] and practically, with The Australian 
Auction for Landscape Recovery Under Uncertainty (ALRUU) leading the way [36], and 
some explorations also carried out in Europe, e.g. in Germany [14,17] and Sweden [37]. 
This latter work, as well as that by Goldman et al.[9], has also highlighted the importance 
of landholder cooperation in achieving the contracted environmental outcome: the effects 
of individual landholder actions extend beyond the boundaries of their private properties, 
especially when mobile species are involved, and synergistic ecological effects are often 
involved.  
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1.3   Objectives and organization of the paper 
The present paper aims to further current knowledge in the field of conservation 
contracting by clarifying key aspects of tendering contracts with payments linked to 
uncertain outcomes. In order to examine the effect of the two opposing forces, the 
incentive effect and the participation effect, we shall study several points on the 
continuum between no payments linked to uncertain outcomes and the totality of 
payments thus linked.  
The second section studies the basic implications of tendering incentive contracts 
using theoretical analysis based on contract and auction theory, and makes a number of 
predictions regarding the results to be expected from tendering contracts with payments 
linked to uncertain outcomes. Because of the complexity of the interactions involved, we 
need to gain some confidence in the theoretical predictions theory. We therefore set up in 
section 3 an economic experiment meant to test the predictions of our theoretical model. 
Section 4 presents the results from the experiments which were carried out in two 
countries.  In order to disentangle the effects of the two policy variables – the contracting 
on uncertain outcomes and the tendering of such contracts – we first examine contracts 
that are not tendered, then compare the results under tender. In this way we are able to 
address the combined effect of tendering outcome-based contracts. A final section 
concludes.  
 
2.   Theoretical propositions    
In this section, we develop a decision-making framework to study the tradeoff 
between the incentive effect and the participation effect. In the following exposition, we 
assume that a landholder aims at maximizing expected utility E[U] by choosing effort 
level x. 
( 1)  ( ) max
x EU ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ π %
 
with   representing uncertain profit. If the landholder chooses to opt out or does not win 
a contract, profit is assumed to be zero.  
π %
 
2.1 Non-tendered  setting 
In the non-tendered setting, the landholder faces two distinct profit outcomes 
depending on whether or not he/she achieves the environmental outcome threshold  :  
_
y





     if         else pfp
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y is the actual environmental outcome; C(x) is the cost of effort x which is monotonously 
increasing; pf is the fixed payment; pp is the performance payment which is tied to the 
achievement of the environmental outcome threshold  . Environmental outcome is 
monotonously increasing in effort and also depends on factors beyond the control of the 
landholder. The two possible profit outcomes in (2) form the distribution of profits   for 





( 3)  () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) () 1 fp f EU gx U p p Cx gx U p Cx =+ − + − − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ π %  
with g(x) representing the probability of achieving   which is monotonously increasing 
and concave in x. An agent will be willing to sign a contract if individual rationality 
constraint (4) holds:  
_
y
( 4)  () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 () 1 0 0 p EU gx U gx U EU U ππ =+ − > = ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ π %
 
for some x. 
Else he/she will reject the contract.  
The first-order conditions (foc) for optimal effort are found by taking the derivative of (3) 
with respect to x 
( 5)
 
() () () () ( ) () () 00
() () () ()
() 1 pp
EU gx Cx gx Cx
Ug x U U g x U
x xx x
ππ π π







and setting it equal to zero. Rearranging terms yields 




UU g x U g x U
x xx
ππ π π





According to (6), effort is optimal at the level where the marginal change in expected 
utility due to a higher probability for the higher profit must equal the marginal loss of 
utility due to higher cost of effort. The second-order condition (to ensure a maximum) is 
shown in Appendix 1 (A1). In our experiments we lowered the fixed payment and raised 
the performance payment by the same amount. From Appendix 1 (A3) we can conclude 
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that optimal effort rises as this substitution continues. We thus obtain 
 
Proposition 1 (incentive effect): Given a constant total payment, individual effort 
increases with the proportion linked to environmental outcome.  
 
The condition relating to the decision to participate or not is intuitive: increasing 
the proportion of outcome-based payment will cause some risk-averse agents to opt out if 
and only if negative profits from a contract are possible. If only positive profits are 
possible the profit distribution of participation is first-degree stochastically dominant over 
that of non-participation and agents will choose to participate irrespective of their risk 
attitudes. If pf < C(x), non-achievement of  y  can result in a net loss. This loss increases 
with the share of payment linked to outcome. We thus obtain  
 
Proposition 2 (participation effect): If agents are risk-averse and scheme participation 
can result in a net loss, an increase in the share of outcome-based payments leads to 
declining participation rates. 
 
A less obvious effect of risk aversion is that it can also affect optimal effort levels. To 
examine this effect, we rewrite ( 5) by replacing 
() () () () ( ) 0000 p p UUU U ππ π π π π ′ −≈ − = p p ′ . Setting πp – π0 = pp follows directly 
from (2). Likewise, we set  () ( ) ( ) 00 p p UU U ππ π ′′ ′ ′ −≈p . This substitution yields:  
( 7) 
  ()
() () () 00
() () ()
() pp
EU gx Cx Cx
Up g x Up U
xx x
ππ
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For a given degree of risk aversion, an agent chooses optimal effort such that the right-
hand side of (8) equals r. To find out whether optimal effort is higher or lower for more 
risk-averse agents, we take the derivative of (8) with respect to x (see the Appendix 1(A2) 
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The sign of (9) is ambiguous, implying that higher degrees of absolute risk aversion can 
result in either higher or lower levels of effort being chosen in the optimum. We have 
calibrated our experiments such that the sign of (9) is strictly positive. From this we 
postulate that the following proposition holds for our experimental results: 
  
Proposition 3: Higher degrees of absolute risk aversion correspond to higher levels of 
individual effort being chosen.  
 
2.2 Tendered  setting 
In our model and experimental setup, agents in the tendered setting compete for 
contracts through effort. The conservation agency selects winning bids by the level of 
effort offered. This is in contrast to ordinary procurement auctions where bidders 
compete through financial bids for contracts with predetermined tasks. To explore the 
impact of bidding competition on participation and optimal effort, we embed the above 
contract model into a procurement auction framework. The landholder’s utility function 
in the tendered setting then becomes  
( 10)  () () () () ( ) () 10 EU hxEU hx U ⎡⎤ =+ − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ππ % %%
 
( 11)  () () () ( ) () ( )( 0 ()() ()1 1 () 0 p EU hxgxU hx g x U hx U ππ ⎡⎤ =+ − + − ⎣⎦ π % % )
. 
with h(x) being the subjective probability of winning a contract which is strictly 
increasing in x.  
Neglecting transactions costs of bid preparation and submission, the necessary 
condition for offering a bid is identical to individual rationality constraint ( 4) in the non-
tendered setting (see Appendix 1 (A4) for a formal proof). We thus obtain  
 
Proposition 4: Participation rates in the non-tendered setting equal bidding rates in the 
tendered setting.  
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To derive the first-order condition (foc) for optimal effort in the tendered setting, 




() () () ( ) ( () 0
()
() 1 () 0 p
EU EU hx
hx gx U gx U U
xx x
ππ
⎡⎤ ∂ ∂ ⎡⎤ ∂ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ =+ + −
∂∂ ∂
π π % % %
) −  
The first summand on the right-hand side is the foc for optimal effort in the non-tendered 
setting weighted by the probability of winning a contract. The second summand in (12) is 
the individual rationality constraint weighted by the marginal change in the probability of 
winning a contract. To study the impact of tendering on optimal effort, we check whether 
(12) equals zero when evaluated at the optimal effort level in the non-tendered setting. In 
that case, the first summand must be zero for the foc under non-tendering to hold. The 
second summand, representing the individual rationality constraint, must be strictly 
positive. Otherwise an agent would not participate. As a consequence, the sign of (12) 
must be strictly positive under tender. From this we can formulate  
 
Proposition 5: As long as individual rationality constraint ( 4) holds, individual effort is 
higher when contracts are allocated by tender. 
 
Indeed, tendering adds a second layer of uncertainty, that of not being selected, over and 
above the risk of not achieving the BV threshold. A higher level of effort thus reduces the 
risk of not being selected as well as that of not achieving the threshold. 
The effect of risk aversion on optimal effort cannot, however, be predicted under 
tender. In analogy to the non-tendered scenario, the foc for optimal effort (12) can be 













hx p p gxp Cx U x xx r









                                                
 
Whether the right-hand side increases or decreases with the level of effort depends on 
h(x), the probability of winning a contract. Since agents will have different perceptions of 




1 There might be one or two maxima in (10). This issue is elaborated in Appendix 1 (A5).  
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3.   Experimental design 
The experiments did not aim to study the effort response to performance 
payments per se, but rather whether any efficiency gains, both in terms of effort provision 
and in terms of expected environmental outcome, could be obtained by the combination 
of performance payments and tendering. To disentangle these two effects, it was 
necessary to compare the tendered and non-tendered contracts.  
The non-tendered scenario was implemented through a contract experiment which 
systematically varied the proportion of payment linked to environmental outcomes from 
zero per cent through 50 and 67 to 100 per cent of the total payment. The core idea is to 
examine how the substitution of a sure fixed payment with an uncertain performance 
payment, while holding total payment constant, affects the supply of individual effort (as 
per Proposition 1) and participation (Proposition 2) and whether the supply of effort is 
affected by risk attitudes (Proposition 3). The combined effect of individual effort and 
participation rate yields total effort which determines expected environmental benefits 
generated by the scheme.  
The tendered scenario was implemented through a procurement auction 
experiment which asked experimental subjects to bid for a limited number of contracts 
with performance payments. As spelled out above, bidding occurred through effort: the 
more effort somebody offered, the higher the probability of winning a contract. The 
purpose of the auction experiment was to study whether competition creates an additional 
incentive for effort (Proposition 4) or participation (Proposition 5) and whether risk 
attitudes play a role in these relationships (Proposition 6). Unlike in the non-tendered 
scenario, total effort obtained, and thus expected environmental benefits generated, not 
only depends on the participation rate but also on the selection rate, as decided by the 
tendering authority. Table 1 provides an overview of the experimental setup.  
[Table 1 about here]  
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TABLE 1 










1) NT 0% (calculated)  9; min 3  300 0 
2) NT 50%   9; min 3  150 150 
3) NT 67%   9; min 3  100 200 
4) NT 100%   9  0 300 
Tendered contracts 
5) T 0% 
( ) 2 9; min 3  300 0 
6) T 50%   9; min 3  150 150 
7) T 67%   9; min 3  100 200 
8) T 100%   9  0 300 
Legend:  9 = bidder’s decision (There was no minimum effort when no fixed payment was offered.) 
NT = Non-tendered scenario; T = tendered scenario 
Payment amounts in ECUs (experimental currency units) 
     
  The conservation contracts referred to biodiversity enhancement in farmed 
landscapes. Experimental subjects were given information about the environmental goals 
of the conservation scheme and the conservation activities (actions) that they could carry 
out to that effect. These activities translated directly into ‘effort’, which could vary 
between 0 and a maximum of 10 units. Whenever a non-zero fixed payment was offered, 
a minimum level of effort was also required as per Table 1. Effort was costly, with a 
linear cost function of 10 ECUs (Experimental Currency Units) per unit. An 
‘environmental production function’ defined the probability of achieving a ‘biodiversity 
value’ threshold (BV) as a monotonously increasing function of effort. This probability 
had two possible values for any given level of effort: a higher and a lower value, 
representing, respectively, a favorable and an unfavorable series of uncontrollable 
environmental events (disease, drought, fire, etc.), thereby defining a state-contingent 
production function. Each of these two states of nature was equiprobable. In addition, 
participants were divided into two groups equal in numbers: half had a higher 
environmental productivity, and half had a lower productivity. For the same level of 
effort, a more productive participant had a higher average probability, across the two 
states of nature, of achieving the environmental (BV) threshold than a less productive 
participant. This distinction was included to investigate the capacity of the tender to 
                                                 
2 The computation of this scenario was actually based on another series of similar experiments, where 
bidders competed through payment (price) bids with predetermined fixed effort, instead of through supply 
of effort with given payments. The 0%PP results were used and recalibrated using effort-to-payment ratios.  
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mitigate the adverse selection problem present with non-tendered contracts
3. The 
combined effect of two environmental states and two participant types yields the four 
environmental productivity curves depicted in Figure 1.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Probability of achieving the BV threshold 






































Legend: y bar represents y  
L0, L1 = Low productivity type: unfavorable and favorable states of nature  
H0, H1 = High productivity type: unfavorable and favorable states of nature 
 
FIGURE 1  
ENVIRONMENTAL STATE-CONTINGENT PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS FOR TWO 
STATES AND TWO PRODUCER TYPES 
 
These quadratic production functions were calibrated using the values shown in Table 2.  
[Table 2 about here] 
TABLE 2 
PRODUCTION FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS 
Common equation 
g(x|θ) = ax – bx
2  
Favorable envir. 
θ = 0 
Unfavorable envir. 
θ = 1 
For low productivity 
type   
a = 0.085 
b = 0.0036 
a = 0.120 
b = 0.0052 
For high productivity 
type   
a = 0.105 
b = 0.0036 
a = 0.140 
b = 0.0052 
 g(x|θ) = probability of achieving the biodiversity threshold conditional on the state of nature 
  x = participant’s level of effort provided 
  a and b = production function coefficients 
  
Participants in the experiment were given a table showing the probabilities of achieving 
                                                 
3 This aspect is not reported in this paper.  
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the BV threshold as a function of effort for each of the two states of nature. They were 
also told what productivity type they were (low or high) and were reminded that effort 
was costly. They were informed that the total payment consisted of a fixed and a 
performance payment and that the latter would only be paid if the BV threshold was 
achieved. They were also informed of the procedure for assessing the biodiversity 
outcome at the end of the contract period. This was done by two random draws at the end 
of each experimental session: one which determined the state of nature (favorable or 
unfavorable), and one that determined whether the threshold had been achieved or not. 
The resolution of the state of nature was done by tossing a coin (the two states being 
equiprobable). The odds for the second draw were determined by the units of effort a 
participant had offered, depending on his or her productivity type and given the state of 
nature. This determined for each participant whether they had achieved the BV threshold 
or not. The information provided was sufficient to enable participants to balance the cost 
of effort and its benefit in terms of achieving the uncertain outcome. If they did not find 
the contract attractive enough they had the opportunity to reject it by ticking an opt-out 
box.  
In the auction experiment, the tender mechanism was of the target-constrained 
rather than of the budget-constrained type (see [30] for an analysis of their comparative 
advantages). Bidders were informed that only two-thirds of them would be selected 
starting with the highest effort supply. Ties were selected randomly.  
So as not to distract from the main focus of the experiments, participation costs 
were equal for all, and consisted of a fixed transaction cost of 50 ECUs and a variable 
cost of 10 ECUs per unit effort. In order to make the individual rationality constraint (4) 
binding, experiments were calibrated so as to allow the possibility of net losses from 
participation. At the end of the experiment, participants’ net gains were converted to local 
currency in proportion to net gains in ECU terms. To avoid net losses in real money, 
participants were endowed with an amount of initial wealth equal to the maximum 
possible net loss. Initial wealth endowments were added to net gains at the end of the 
experiment.  
Since the results were likely to be affected by risk attitudes, we submitted all 
participants with a simple lottery, which asked them to consider a lottery ticket that had a 
50% chance of earning them $1000. They were then asked the maximum amount they 
were willing to pay to purchase one. A number below the expected gain of $500 was a 
measure of risk aversion, while a number above $500 was a measure of risk taking. As 
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the results below suggest, the data, however crude, proved sufficient to shed some light 
on the role of risk attitudes. This was all done prior to, and independently of, the core part 
of the experiment, albeit in the same session and with the same participants.  
The experiments were carried out in two different countries, in Kiel, Germany, at 
the Christian-Albrechts University, and in Perth at the University of Western Australia, to 
control for robustness of the results. The Kiel experiment was carried out with 
postgraduate students in agricultural economics. Participants in the Perth experiment 
were both undergraduate and postgraduate students. The number of participants in each 
session varied somewhat but averaged 20. The environmental context for the experiment 
was chosen in a way that reflected the participants’ experience with the issue: 
enhancement of skylark populations in Kiel and conservation of remnant vegetation on 
private land in Perth. An overview of the experimental parameters and their values is 
given in Box 1. 
BOX 1: EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS 
•  Two locations (Kiel and Perth): to control for robustness of results 
•  Number of groups (2 x 2) and group size (≈ 20) 
•  Participant types (low and high productivity, in equal proportions) 
•  States of nature, uncertain (0 and 1: unfavorable & favorable ex-post coin toss) 
•  Risk spread between the two states of nature: probability of achieving the BV 
threshold, g(x), held constant in this study for given productivity type 
•  Incentive contracts: 50%, 67% and 100% PP (The 0% case was computed) 
•  Freedom not to participate (opt-out) 
•  Tender type: target-constrained (as opposed to budget-constrained)  
•  Type of bid: through supply of effort; effort could be chosen on a scale from 0 to 
10 units 
•  Selection ratio (under tender): 2/3 of bidders in each session by effort level; no 
selection in the non-tendered case  
•  Decision variables: participation; individual effort offered  
•  Policy parameters: fixed payment; performance payment 
•  Participation costs: equal for all = fixed transaction cost + cost per unit effort 
•  Initial wealth: 0; 50; 100 ECUs: to avoid net real final losses 
•  Information given after each round: none (one-off bid, no learning)  
PP = Performance Payment, linked to achievement of outcome: it constitutes the incentive payment    
BV = Biodiversity Value threshold, which defines the achievement target  
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4.   Experimental results    
4.1   Organization of results 
Examining the impact of performance payments on participant effort carries its 
own value in terms of research results; however, the main focus of this study was to 
assess the value of tendering the contracts and therefore also how to disentangle the two 
aspects when combined. In the non-tendered treatment, we focus on the effects of 
increasing the proportion of performance payments relative to fixed (input) payments, 
while in the tendered treatment, we focus on how tendering the contracts modifies the 
non-tendered results. Accordingly, we present the non-tendered treatment (henceforth 
NT) results separately from the tendered treatment (henceforth T) results.  
  The following sections present first the NT treatment followed by the T treatment.  
The results reported here focus primarily on across-group averages; group-specific results 
are reported if any were observed. Except where indicated, all results were tested for 
statistical significance at the 5% confidence interval.  
 
4.2   Non-tendered treatment (NT): impact of increasing performance payments 
4.2.1  Supply of individual effort  
The prediction from Proposition 1 in section 2 is that the supply of individual 
effort should increase with the proportion of the total payment, kept constant, that is 
linked to the environmental outcome (henceforth %PP).  In the %PP scenario, a minimum 
level of effort of 3 units was required. Although this specific value is arbitrary, the 
important point to keep in mind is that, left to themselves, participants would have chosen 
the smallest level of effort possible, either 0 or 1, depending on their perceptions of what 
was acceptable. As Figure 2 shows, our experimental results do not completely bear out 
Proposition 1. At 50%PP, individual effort is indeed much higher than the strict minimum 
(be it 0, 1 or 3), but it then remains constant as %PP is raised further – an observation 
consistent across the four experimental groups. Do risk attitudes help explain this result? 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
FIGURE 2  
 
INDIVIDUAL EFFORT OFFERED AS A FUNCTION OF THE SHARE OF PAYMENT 
LINKED TO OUTCOME (STATISTICS GIVEN IN APPENDIX 2) 
 
4.2.2  Effect of risk attitudes on supply of effort 
Proposition 3 in section 2 predicts that, all other things held equal, a higher degree 
of risk aversion should increase optimal effort. Our experimental results vary somewhat 
from this prediction, as Table 3 shows. Read vertically (to keep the treatment parameter 
constant), risk attitudes appear to have no effect on the supply of individual effort, except 
at the highest %PP rate. At 100%PP, risk-averse individuals do supply a level of effort 
that is about 23% higher than non risk averse individuals. To understand this discrepancy, 
we need to know what happens to the participation rate, given that the effort shown in 
Figure 2 and Table 3 only relate to those who did not choose to opt out.  
 [Table 3 about here]:  
TABLE 3: Risk attitudes and individual effort provision, read vertically  









RA  5.9   5.9  7.2
RN  5.7 5.6  5.8 
RP  6.1 5.8  5.9 
Legend: RA = risk averse; RN = risk neutral; RP = risk prone 
 
4.2.3 Participation  rate  
The theoretical prediction from Proposition 2 was that as %PP increases, 
participation should fall, due to the increasing likelihood of net losses if effort is invested 
but the environmental threshold is not achieved.  This is borne out by our results, on 
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average and consistently across all four experimental groups (Figure 3). In our 
experiments participation started dropping at around 67% PP, but only became substantial 
at 100% PP, where the participation rate fell to 60%. The exact numbers for opt-out rates 
depend of course on the specific values for probabilities, effort productivity, costs and 
payments as per Figure 1 and Table 2. However, a clear pattern emerges: up to a certain 
point, increasing %PP has no impact on participation, but past that point, increasing %PP 
reduces participation: an increasing proportion of individuals end up deciding that the 
risk of a net loss is not worth the minimal effort required for receiving the fixed payment; 
they decide to ‘opt out’ and not sign a contract. This simply reflects the fall in expected 
net profits from participation as riskiness increases and the fact that individuals respond 
to the individual rationality constraint of equation (4).    








0% 50% 67% 100%
% of payment linked to outcome
 
FIGURE 3 
 PARTICIPATION RATES AS A FUNCTION OF THE SHARE OF PAYMENT LINKED TO 
OUTCOME  
 
Does participation explain the difference in individual effort shown in Figure 2, in 
particular between 100%PP and the lower %PP scenarios? More precisely, does the 
composition and risk profile of those who ‘stay in’ change as the number of drop-outs 
increases in the 100%PP scenario? Table 4 provides perhaps part of the answer, in that we 
do observe across all four experimental groups such a change. As one would expect, at 
high levels of risk (100%PP), the number of risk-averse individuals drops while the 
number of risk-prone individuals increases (this holding under both non-tendered and 
tendered scenarios); but the magnitude of the changes remain rather small.   
 
 
TABLE 4:  
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Average risk profiles in the 100%PP scenario relative to the whole population  
   ALL  100%PP  100%PP 
   (Certainty Equiv.)  NT  T 
RA 63  −9%  −5% 
RN 100     
RP 144  +2%  +10% 
Legend: RA = risk averse; RN = risk neutral; RP = risk prone 
[Table 4 about here] 
4.2.4  Effect of risk attitudes on participation rate  
From Propositions 2 and 3 taken together, one would expect that higher risk 
aversion should reduce participation. However, as Table 5 indicates, this is not quite as 
straightforward as theoretical analysis might suggest. Risk-averse participants opt out 
only at the highest %PP rate, while non risk-averse participants exhibit the same pattern. 
The effect is of second-order only: risk-averse participants only drop out more than non 
risk-averse ones do, and only marginally more so than risk-neutral ones. .  
[Table 5 about here]   









RA  100% 100%  57% 
RN  100% 95%  62% 
RP  100% 100%  87% 
 
Legend: RA = risk averse; RN = risk neutral; RP = risk prone 
 
These results help us explain the discrepancy between theoretical prediction and 
observed results regarding the role of risk aversion on the supply of individual effort. 
Recall that the numbers in Table 3 exclude those who decided to opt out, which mainly 
concerns the 100%PP case. In Table 5, to the extent that risk aversion reduces 
participation rates, it counter-acts the increase in the supply of individual effort. The 
interpretation must therefore be as follows: higher risk aversion ends up reducing 
participation, but, for those who do decide to participate, it extracts a higher effort level. 
From the risk-averse individual’s point of view, the decision seems to be: either opt out 
or, if not, put in a high level of effort to reduce the risk of not achieving the BV threshold. 
This allows us to refine the theoretical prediction: for high %PP rates, higher risk 
aversion should end up reducing average individual supply of effort in that the drop in 
participation ends up outweighing the increase in individual effort. This comes out clearly 
in our results: in the 100%PP case, participation drops with rising risk aversion from 87% 
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to 57%, or by −30% (Table 5), whereas effort increases from 5.8 or 5.9 to 7.2, or by 
+22%, +23% (Table 3). In relative terms, the drop in participation is thus greater than the 
rise in individual effort, but not substantially so, and only for the highest %PP rate.  
 
4.2.5  Scheme performance implications: environmental outcomes and cost-effectiveness  
Total effort and expected outcome. Total effort results from the combination of 
individual effort and participation. Since increases in %PP were shown to initially 
increase effort but reduce participation, it is not surprising that total effort exhibits an 
inverse U curve, as per Figure 4a. There thus exists an optimum level of %PP. In our 
experiments, it ranged between 50%PP and 67%PP. Since expected outcome is a 
monotonously increasing function of total effort, as per Figure 1, this result also extends 
to the expected level of environmental outcome.  
[Figures 4a and 4b about here] 
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0% 50% 67% 100%
% of payment linked to outcome
FIGURES 4a and 4b 
 TOTAL EFFORT (4a) AND BUDGETARY COST-EFFECTIVENESS (4b) AS A FUNCTION 
OF THE SHARE OF PAYMENT LINKED TO OUTCOME  
(AVERAGES ACROSS ALL FOUR GROUPS) 
 
Cost-effectiveness. Defining cost-effectiveness by the payment outlay per unit of 
total effort or, equivalently, per unit of expected outcome, the story changes: in this case, 
the higher the %PP, the lower the payout per unit of environmental outcome obtained, 
and so the higher the cost-effectiveness, as shown in Figure 4b. From a policy 
perspective, when deciding what %PP rate is best, one must make trade-offs between the 
two objectives of outcome level and cost-effectiveness.  
 
4.3   Tendered treatment (T): impact of tendering the contracts 
4.3.1  Supply of individual effort under tender.  
Proposition 5 in section 2 predicted that tendering should increase the supply of 
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individual effort of those who have decided to put in a bid. This extra individual effort 
obtained by tendering is visible over the whole range of performance payments, from 
0%PP to 100%PP (Figure 5a). However, as Figure 5b shows, a second-order effect also 
emerged from our experiments: consistently across all four groups, the rate at which 
tendering extracts additional effort falls as %PP rises. For non-incentive 0%PP contracts, 
tendering extracts about 50% more effort, but this figure drops to 20% for 50%PP and 
further to 15% for 100%PP. This is a result that theoretical analysis was not powerful 
enough to predict. If the transaction costs of organizing and running a tender are taken 
into account, then a compromise must again be struck between performance payments 
and tendering the contracts. From Figure 5a, it is clear that, on average, tendering does 
extract more effort, but there is no advantage in increasing %PP beyond 50%. Thus, what 
was true in the NT case remains true under tender.  
    
[Figures 5a and 5b about here] 
Individual effort put in: Non-T vs Tender
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FIGURES 5 a,b 
IMPACT OF TENDER ON INDIVIDUAL EFFORT OFFERED  
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4.3.2  Participation rate.  
It appeared from Proposition 4 in section 2 that tendering should not modify the 
participation rates obtained in the non-tendered case. Figure 6 shows however this not to 
be entirely true, at least for high values of %PP. Although the 1% lower participation rate 
at the 67%PP level is negligible, the 7% average drop at the 100%PP level, from 59% to 
53%, is significant and consistent across all four experimental groups. This drop in 
participation may be related to two possible causes, though these are only hypotheses at 
this stage. One is the extra mental loading of having to also include the uncertainty of 
being selected, a form of transaction cost. The other is the possible role of ambiguity 
aversion, as opposed to risk aversion, in Ellsberg’s [6] sense:  total uncertainty is greater 
under the combined tender and incentive scheme than in the NT case alone.  
[Figure 6 about here] 
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 IMPACT OF TENDERING ON PARTICIPATION RATES  
 
 
4.3.3  Scheme performance implications: environmental outcomes and cost-effectiveness   
Total effort and outcome obtained. Participation rates and individual supply of 
effort combine with the selection rate to yield total effort obtained, which directly 
translates into the expected level of environmental outcome, as per Figure 1. Here, one 
needs to distinguish between a theoretical and a pragmatic aspect. For the NT and T 
scenarios to be directly comparable, one must apply the same selection ratio to both. But 
in practice, the NT setup will accept all participants whereas in T a selection criterion will 
apply. Figures 7a and 7b present the theoretical comparison and Figures 7c and 7d 
present the pragmatic one, assuming a selection ratio of 2/3 of bidders, a reasonable ratio 
that is close to what has been chosen by policy-makers using conservation tenders (e.g. 
BushTender in Australia)..  
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[Figures 7a to 7d about here] 
Total effort obtainable: (2/3) NT vs T
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FIGURES 7a,b 
IMPACT OF TENDER ON TOTAL EFFORT OBTAINED WITH IDENTICAL SELECTION 
RATIOS 
 
Total effort obtained: Non-T vs Tender
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FIGURES 7c,d 
IMPACT OF TENDER ON TOTAL EFFORT OBTAINED WITH A 2/3 SELECTION RATIO 
ONLY UNDER TENDER 
 
Figures 7a and 7c show that tendering does not modify the pattern observed in the 
NT case, namely, that there exists an optimal %PP, between 50% and 67%, which yields 
maximum total effort and expected outcome. The incremental second-order effects, as 
shown in Figures 7b and 7d, also exhibit similar trends, in that the advantage of tendering 
rapidly falls as payments linked to uncertain outcomes are introduced (see decrease 
between 0%PP and 50%PP). However, their absolute values now strongly depend on the 
policy-determined selection ratio: if equal to 2/3, total incremental effort goes negative 
even before reaching 50%PP, and tendering reduces the expected level of environmental 
outcome
4.  The difference between Figures 7b and 7d will be smaller if the selection 
criterion is greater than 2/3 and tends towards 1 and greater if it is less than 2/3 and tends 
towards 0.  
                                                 
4 The statistical fit is similar to the one in Figure 5b: dx = – 0.50 Ln(%PP) + 0.41, (R
2=0.85), and the log 
slope coefficient is indeed about double the previous value (– 0.50 rather than – 0.26).  
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Cost-effectiveness. If we now focus on budgetary cost-effectiveness, the picture 
again changes, in a similar way it did in the NT scenario. Figure 8a shows that the higher 
the %PP, the better the cost-effectiveness; that is, the smaller the budgetary outlay per 
unit of total effort or expected environmental outcome. The marginal value of running a 
tender is however greatest in cost-effectiveness terms for contracts with only moderate 
payments linked to outcomes (around 50%PP), as Figure 8b suggests.   
[Figures 8a and 8b about here] 
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IMPACT OF TENDER ON TOTAL AND MARGINAL COST-EFFECTIVENESS  
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
5.1   Summary of results: theory and experiments 
Based on a theoretical model, controlled laboratory experiments were designed 
and carried out with four different groups of university students in two countries. The 
purpose was to investigate the effects of tendering incentive conservation contracts on the 
supply of effort and on participation, as well as the effects of different risk attitudes.  
Experimental results for the non-tendered contracts by and large confirmed the 
theoretical predictions, but also added new insights in the form of second-order effects. 
As the proportion of the payment linked to uncertain outcomes increases at the expense 
of the fixed up front payment, the total expected payment remaining constant, the 
participation rate falls, and the supply of individual effort increases, but only up to a 
point, after which it levels off. This results in a trade-off between maximizing the 
expected level of environmental outcome and maximizing budgetary cost-effectiveness. 
Maximizing environmental outcome requires one to limit incentive payments to moderate 
levels, whereas cost-effectiveness is maximized when 100% of the payment is outcome-
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based.  
Taking the previous results as benchmarks, tendering contracts which are subject 
to varying rates of performance payments has the following impacts: with only a slight 
fall in participation at high rates of performance payments, it further increases the supply 
of individual effort, but at a decreasing rate as the proportion of performance payments 
increases. It thus further exacerbates the trade-off between maximizing environmental 
outcome and maximizing cost-effectiveness. Except for very low rates of performance 
payments, when most of the payment is made up front, and taking into account the 
policy-determined selection ratio, tendering actually reduces the expected level of 
environmental outcome. However, tendering raises even further the cost-effectiveness of 
the scheme for all values of performance payments; but the marginal value of the tender 
peaked at moderate performance payment rates of around 50%.   
 
5.2  Limitations and further research  
Theory and experiments, as shown in this study, can usefully complement each 
other. Experiments only partly confirmed theoretical predictions, and more importantly, 
revealed second-order effects not predicted by our model; theory allowed for an 
interpretation of experimental results that was not limited by the specific choice of 
experimental parameters, as per Box 1 and Table 1. Results remain however mostly 
qualitative; in order to gain deeper insights into the magnitude of the effects, changes in 
the following parameters would need to be done following a systematic experimental 
plan:   
-  The probability spread between favorable and unfavorable environments; 
-  The relative values of effort cost and total payment (sum of fixed and performance 
payments); 
-  The degree of heterogeneity across bidders, in particular in their opportunity costs; 
-  The difference in productivity between the two agent types (not reported on in this 
paper), in terms of probabilities of achieving the environmental outcome for the same 
level of effort;  
-  Different participant composition in terms of risk attitudes, for example by sorting 
participants according to their measured risk preferences; 
-  The degree of competition, viz. the number of bidders relative to the available budget;  
-  Format of tender; e.g. discriminatory versus uniform price; target versus budget 
constraint; selection by payment bid instead of by effort provision.  
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Selection by payment bid was investigated as an extension to this study, the 
results of which will be reported in another publication.  Clearly, however, there is still 
more work to be done before gaining a thorough understanding of the factors that 
determine the desirability of tendering incentive contracts for environmental 
conservation. The introduction of transaction costs and uncertainty in the measurement of 
environmental outcomes could drastically modify the results obtained in this study. It 
should then become clearer whether conservation contracts involve any specific features 
when compared to more general propositions, such as those that were theoretically 
studied by Laffont & Tirole in their 1993 work.  
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Appendix 1   
A1. Second-order condition for optimal effort in the non-tendered setting: 
From marginal utility ( 5) follows 
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The first term on the right-hand side is negative if probability g(x) is concave and 
monotonously increasing in effort x. The second term is non-negative as long as the 
marginal costs are non-decreasing in effort. 
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A3. Optimal effort as a function of the proportion of the performance payment  
In the experiment we look at changes of the form ∆pp = – ∆pf, i.e. the fixed payment is 
lowered by the same amount as the performance payment is raised. Substitution of pf for 
pp results in higher optimal effort if derivative ( 5) increases in response to ∆pp = – ∆pf. 
We first repeat the foc based on ( 125) 
() () () () () () () () 00
() () ()
() 1 pp
EU gx Cx Cx
UU g x U g x U
x xx
ππ π π





















. Then  
•  The utility difference in the first summand  ( ) ( ) 0 p UU π π −  increases by 
substituting the fixed payment for the performance payment because π0 decreases 
while πp is not affected. 
•  The marginal utility for the profit  ( ) p U π ′  does not change because πp does not 
change. A change in fixed payment is exactly outweighed by the reverse change in 
the performance payment. 
•  In the third summand, the marginal utility  ( ) 0 U π ′  increases with lower levels of 
the fixed payment because π0 decreases. 
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Optimal effort increases in the performance payment if the sum of the first and the third 
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effect is positive: 
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Since the left-hand side is always positive, the inequality holds for all risk-neutral and 
risk-prone agents with r ≤ 0. We have calibrated the experiment such that the inequality 
also holds for risk-averse agents. The smallest value for the left-hand side in our 
experiment is 0.0038, which is more than eight times higher than the highest absolute risk 
aversions assumed e.g. in Hanson and Ladd (1991) or Lien and Hardaker (2001) for 
landholders. Consequently, we expect that experimental subjects will offer higher effort 
when faced with a higher proportion of payments linked to environmental outcomes.  
 
A4. Individual rationality constraint in the tendered setting 
The necessary condition to offer a bid is  




It follows from ( 11) 
() () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ()() ()1 1 () 0 0 p hxgxU hx g x U hx U EU ππ +− + − > ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ 
() () () ( ) ( ) 0 ()() ()1 () 0 p hxgxU hx g x U hxEU ππ +− >⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ 
() () () () 0 hxEU hxEU > ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎣⎦ ⎣ π % ⎤ ⎦  
() ( ) 0 EU EU > ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎣⎦ ⎣ π % ⎤ ⎦  
which is the individual rationality constraint in the non-tendered setting ( 4).  
 
 
A5. Expected utility maxima under tender  
The number of nulls for the marginal utility under tender (12) depends on h(x) for which 
agents form subjective expectations. Obviously, 0 ≤ h(x) ≤ 1 and h(x) is non-decreasing 
in x. The probability of winning a contract is close to zero for very low effort levels while 
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it is close to 100% for very high effort. For these levels, the probability of winning a 
contract is not affected substantially by offering more effort. We thus think that it is 
reasonable to assume that h(x) is increasing only marginally both at very small and very 
high effort levels. Between these extreme values the probability is increasing at a higher 
rate. Consequently, we assume the shape of h(x) being similar to a probability function of 
a normal distribution, i.e. it is (monotonously) increasing, convex for small values and 
becomes concave for higher values of effort.  
Given this shape of h(x), expected utility function under tender ( 10) may have several 
turning points. If (10) has only one turning point then this must be a maximum: 
multiplying an inverse U-shaped expected utility function under non-tender with a non-
decreasing probability h(x) cannot result in a U-shaped function under tender. Thus, the 
non-tender expected utility function with a maximum cannot become a function with only 
a minimum or a minimum and a maximum in the tendered setting. Then it also follows: if 
(10) has more than one turning point under the assumed shape of h(x) it has two (local) 
maxima and one local minimum. Otherwise the function cannot decrease for very small 
and very high effort levels. 
 
Appendix 2: Statistical analysis of key experimental comparisons 
 






NT 50  NT 67  1.89  3% 
NT 50  NT 100  0.72  ns 
NT 67  NT 100  1.27  ns 
T 50  T 67  2.13  2% 
T 50  T 100  1.34  9% 
T 67  T 100  1.65  5% 
NT 50  T 50  6.16  0.01% 
NT 67  T 67  5.74  0.01% 
NT 100  T 100  3.75  0.01% 
 
Legend:   NT = Non-tendered; T = tendered 
    50, 67, 100 refer to the %PP, the share of given payment linked to outcome 
    ns = non-significant at the 10% confidence level  
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